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1 Current Opinions on Foreign Lending
The United States is now entering its second major period of
foreign lending. It is, at present, the only country with the capacity
for large scale foreign investment with private or public funds, and
the greater part of the world needs its economic aid. The resump-
tion of foreign lending creates a host of problems, political and
economic, which are being widely This study does not
deal directly with these problems. We treat only past experience
but hope that by re-opening the past and by presenting what hap-
pened in a new light we may contribute indirectly to the under-
standing of current problems.
Probably most economists agree that the United States should
export capital.1 However, except for pureiy political loans, this is
considered desirable only on the assumption that foreign lending
will be more successful than in the that the investors' sad
To quote only a few representative opinions;
"A progressive, dynamic world economy on a basis cannot be
reconstructed without the resumption of productive foreign investment."
Report of the Committee on Foreign Economic Relations, appointed by the
Twentieth Century Fund (Norman S. Buchanan and Friedrich A. Lutz,
Rebuilding the World Economy, 1947), p. 305.
"On the basis of the replies received it may be said that economists believe
that a reasonably large outflow of capital is desirable for broad economic and
political reasons. About 90 percent of the replies support this view." Results
of a poll conducted by a Committee of the American Economic Association,
Papers and Proceedings, May 1946, p. 240.
"In the world such as we find it foreign long-term lending is another essen-
tial prerequisite for the successful operation of a stable international currency
system." Ragnar Nurkse, International Currency (League of Na-
tions, 1944), p. 202.
"It is both natural and logical that American should resume invest-
ment activity abroad." H. B. Lary, The United States in the World Economy
(Department of Commerce, Economic Series No.1943), p. 19.
I2 CURRENT OPINIONS ON FOREIGN LENDING
experience with foreign loans will not be repeated.2 Will this be
possible and how can it be achieved? The answer depends partly
upon one's interpretation of the past.
According to widespread popular opinion almost all the Ameri-
can money invested in foreign loans has been lost. Experts know,
of course, that this is not true. In their excellent and comprehen-
sive investigation of foreign lending J. T. Madden, Marcus Nadler,
and Harry Sauvain find: "The fact is that interest has been paid
in full, through the longest and most severe depression of modern
times, on almost two-thirds of all the foreign bonds currently
[December 1935] outstanding."3 Although losses on foreign bonds
were smaller than generally believed they were large enough to
constitute a grave problem. Investors cannot be encouraged to
buy foreign bonds again unless there is reason to expect that the
outcome will be better. What are the chances for such an improve-
ment?
The answers experts offer differ according to the factors they
hold mainly responsible for past defaults and their views on the
possibility and probability of removing or controlling such factors
in the future. Many factors conducive to defaults on foreign loans
have been and discussed, factors so numerous and power-
ful that the reader is sometimes surprised to find that two-thirds
of all loans remained safe and sound after all.
First, there are factors inherent in the loans themselves. A large
number of foreign loans, undoubtedly, were mistaken ex ante, i.e.,
had they been carefully weighed in the light of then prevailing
'"The world would do well to avoid, even at considerable cost, another debacle
of defaults and repudiations, replete with recriminations and strained relation-
ships, such as followed upon the last upswing in American foreign lending in
the twenties." Norman Buchanan, International Investment and Domestic
Welfare (Holt, 1945), p. 120.
"To establish a sounder foundation for foreign lending in future is therefore
one of the two or three most important reforms the world needs...." Sir
Arthur Salter, Recovery (London, 1931), p. 128.
'America's Experience as Creditor Nation (Prentice Hall, 1937), p. 136. See
also Cleona Lewis, America's Stake in International Investments (Brookings
Institution, 1938), p. 398: "Of the existing foreign bonds that were originally
issued here during the prosperous twenties, around 35 to 40 per cent are now
[1935] in default."INTRODUCTION 3
conditions they would never have been granted. Second, other
loans were basically sound, and were defaulted only because of
the sudden termination of foreign lending and the general depres-
sion. These have been termed bad investmepts ex post.4 The factors
responsible for ex ante bad loans have frequently been deemed
relatively unimportant. "Under the combined influence of the fall
in business activity and in prices, the imposition of the tariff of
1930, and the cessation of new foreign investment, the total
amount of dollars paid out by the States to foreign coun-
tries fell from 7,400 million dollars in 1929 to only 2,400 millions
in 1932. At the same time foreign had contractual debt-
service payments of some 900 millions due to the United States
each year. Under such circumstances it was inevitable that many
of these obligations should be defaulted. By comparison with the
magnitude of these strains, all other explanations of the relatively
unsatisfactory outcome of the past lending experience of
the United States must be of distinctly setondary significance. It
is for this reason that I have not attempted to appraise in detail
the results of this experience in analyzing future possibilities..
.
Thisemphasis on the transfer problem leads to the view that the
success of future loans is predicated on two conditions: American
capital must be exported at a stable rate in order to prevent sudden
reversals in the balance of payments of debtor countries; and
American imports must be expanded in to assure the service
of new foreign loans through an adequate Supply of dollars. Opin-
ions differ as to whether these conditions will be met in the future.
2 Nature of the Study
We approach foreign lending from a different angle. Rather than
focus attention on the economic conditions prevailing when foreign
See Ragnar Nurkse, Internationale Kapitalbewegungen (Vienna, 1935), p.
210. For an enumeration of factors inherent in the loans themselves see, e.g.,
Cleona Lewis, op. cit., pp. 403-10.
H. B. Lary, American Economic Association, Ppers and Proceedings, May
1945, p. 683. See also Madden et al., op. cit., p. 166: "The transfer problem
must be regarded as the principal cause of the defaults on foreign dollar
bonds during the 1930's." The same view is expressed in International Capital
Movements during the Inter-War Period (United Nations, 1949).4 NATURE OF THE STUDY
loans were defaulted, or deal with the impact of the great depres-
sion on outstanding loans, we investigate the relation between
conditions at the time of issue of the loans and their quality, their
ability to stand the test of depression. Defaulted foreign loans have
hitherto been analyzed with reference to time of default, type of
borrower (government or private), and form of lending (port-
folio or direct); the time of lending has virtually been ignored.
The customary treatment considers foreign loans as if they had
been parts of one great investment project instead of a sequence
of individual investments. This is grossiy inadequate if the quality
of the loans changed drastically.
Current judgments on American experience with the foreign
loans of the 1920's might be refined and corrected if more atten-
tion were paid to the general economic situation at the time of
their issue and its influence on their character and soundness. The
main period of foreign lending, 192 1-29, was marked by an ex-
traordinary expansion of financial activity, mounting in three suc-
cessively higher waves and culminating in the 'speculative mania'
of 1929. Is it not probable that new foreign loans reflected this?
Should we not expect the quality of foreign loans to change during
such a period, to deteriorate as speculation increased and the boom
swelled? And if it did change in any considerable degree would
not that affect our judgment and evaluation of the experience
with foreign lending?
Though we deal exclusively with American foreign lending, the
analysis may have a wider bearing. As far as we know, fluctua-
tions in the quality of new investments of any kind have seldom
been investigated empirically. One exception is R. J. Saulnier's
study of urban mortgage loans. Another is G. W. Edwards' analysis
of domestic bonds. Both studies are described more fully in Chap-
ter 2. Otherwise, although business failures and defaults have
been related to various factors, including conditions at the time
of failure, little if any attention had been paid to conditions at the
time of investment.
Yet fluctuations in investment quality appear to be relevant to
the understanding of economic change, particularly the business
cycle. Deterioration in investment quality may be one of the factorsINTRODUCTION 5
implicit in such terms as 'over-optimism', 'reckless speculation',
'boom psychology'. It may prove to be one of the maladjustments
that, as in Wesley C. Mitchell's or Gottfried Haberler's theories
of the business cycle, develop during expansion and contribute to
the downturn.
More specifically, decline in investment quality between 1921
and 1929 would fit well into Arthur F. Burns' and Wesley C.
Mitchell's hypothesis regarding major this period being
the expansion phase of one of these major cycles. Their argument
runs as follows: "After a severe depression industrial activity re-
bounds sharply, but speculation does not. The following contrac-
tion in business is mild, which leads to be less cautious.
Consequently, in the next two or three cycles, while the cyclical
advances become progressively smaller in industrial activity, they
become progressively larger in activity. Finally, the
speculative boom collapses and a drastic liquidation follows, which
ends this cycle of cycles and brings us ba1ck to the starting point."
When people become "less cautious" the proportion of unsound
investments is likely to increase in various fields.
As an instance of explicit referencethe deterioration of new
investments, we may note J. A. Schumpeter's discussion of cyclical
expansions, which are characterized in his view by the develop-
ment of "reckless, fraudulent, or otherwise unsuccessful enter-
prise, which cannot stand the tests administered by recession."1
The importance Schumpeter attributed to this factor is evident
in his diagnosis of the great depression: "I submit that, given.
depressive tendency and supernormal 4ensitivity, the following
facts constitute adequate explanation of the 'disaster' in the United
States. I
Thefirst fact is the speculative mania of 1927-29....The
second fact was the weakness of the United States banking system.
•..Thirdin importance was the mortgage situation, both urban
and rural. Again I maintain that its mOst serious features were
entirely due to reckless borrowing and lending; that is to say, to
• Arthur F. Burns and Wesley C. Mitchell, Business Cycles (NBER,
1946), p. 460.
Business Cycle: (McGraw-Hill, 1939), I, 148.6 SOME REMARKS ON OUR FINDINGS
avoidable deviations from normal business practice. The explana-
tory value for the crisis of this element is ten times as great as that
of the most elegant difference equation."8
Extensive investigation would, of course, be required to obtain
measurements of quality fluctuations in major fields of investment.
By endeavoring to obtain some new insights into one historical
experience, the foreign lending of the twenties, we hope to make
a modest contribution to such a broad
onOur Findings
The statistical analysis in Chapter 2 shows how greatly the quality
of new foreign issues, as measured by the proportion that subse-
quently defaulted, deteriorated during the 11 years 1920-30. For
example, only 6 percent of the issues of 1920 went to borrowers
who defaulted in the 1930's while 63 percent of those of 1928
suffered this fate; and of all loans issued in the 5 years, 1920-24,
only 18 percent went to borrowers who defaulted in the 1930's
while for 1925-29 the ratio is as high as 50 percent.
If we consider the impact of unsound loans upon sound ones it
is even more striking that issues of the early twenties fared so much
better in the crisis than later issues. "Supposing. .. thata modest
and useful loan had already been issued to, and on the credit of,
a' particular country, and utilized for the most productive pur-
poses; the subscriber would still lose if later and wasteful loans
disorganized the public finances [of the borrowing country] and
compelled default."° Among the defaulted issues of the early twen-
ties some "modest and useful" loans were doubtless defaulted
because of later wasteful ones. Consequently, the difference be-
tween the outcome of early and that of later loans reflects only a
part of the difference in their original qualities. It is the more
significant that 82 percent of the loans of the early period remained
sound.
The big variations in loan quality and the satisfactory outcome
of early loans cannot be explained by transfer difficulties, since
$TheDecade of the Twenties, American Economic Association, Papers and
Proceedings, May 1946, pp. 8-10.
Salter, op. Cit., p. 123.INTRODUCTION
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dollar scarcity in the thirties affected loans of 1920 as much as
those of 1928. Nor can they be the other factors held
responsible for adverse results of American foreign lending, such
as: "our ineptness at this type of "the very nature of
capital accumulation with the assistance of foreign borrowing",
etc." Factors that might explain the results of lending in
general do not suffice to explain differences in the outcome of
loans issued at different times. They originate in other forces
which have so far received less attention.
The evaluation of American experience with foreign lending
may be modified by our findings. One of experts indicts the
granting of credits between the two world wars as a complete
mistake; another deems it on the whole sound and reasonable and
holds the great depression solely responsible for its failure. Both
views must be corrected if most foreign loans floated in the early
years after World War I were sound and most of the mistakes
were made in the later twenties, abnormal years in many respects.
In the future it might be possible to results of foreign
lending by applying the methods of the past successful times while
avoiding as far as possible thoseof the years of unsuccessful lending.
Wesley C. Mitchell, NBER, 24th Annual Report, 1944, p. 26.
Buchanan, op. cit., p. 116.